From the Summa Theologica.
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Whether the pain of Christ's Passion was greater
than all other pains?
Objection 1. It would seem that the pain of
Christ's Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer's pain
is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of
the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in
St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh
was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering
Christ was not the greatest.
Objection 2. Further, strength of soul
mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the
soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the
mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore
it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.
Objection 3. Further, the more sensitive the
sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive
than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the
state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who
assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the
pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam's pain, if he
suffered at all, was greater than Christ's in the Passion.
Objection 4. Further, the greater the good
lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than
Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of
nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three
days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in
death. Therefore it seems that Christ's pain was not the greatest of all.
Objection 5. Further, the victim's innocence
lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to
Jeremiah 9:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a
victim." Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ's Passion was not the
greatest.
Objection 6. Further, there was nothing
superfluous in Christ's conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to
secure man's salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had
infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the
greatest of all pains.
On the contrary, It is written (Lamentations
1:12) on behalf of Christ's Person: "O all ye that pass by the way attend,
and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow."
I answer that, As we have stated, when treating
of the defects assumed by Christ (15, 5,6), there was true and sensible pain in
the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also,
there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something
hurtful, and this is termed "sadness." And in Christ each of these
was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes.
First
of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was
the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the
extent of the suffering already mentioned (5]) and from the kind of suffering,
since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in
nervous and highly sensitive parts--to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the
weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. And besides this there is
the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain
by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of
the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes
them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Psalm 21:2): "The words of my
sins."
Secondly,
especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death
chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss
of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.
The
magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility
of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most
perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of
the Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by miracles are better than
others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which
Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's
sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain,
was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most
vehemently all the causes of sadness.
Thirdly,
the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His
pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and
even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some
derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not
so with the suffering Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers
to exercise its proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).
Fourthly,
the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that
the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men's deliverance
from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the
magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.
From
all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain was the very
greatest.
Reply to Objection
1. This argument
follows from only one of the considerations adduced--namely, from the bodily
injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering
Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.
Reply to Objection
2. Moral virtue
lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite
another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being
its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in I-II, 64, 2, moral
virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity,
but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go
beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be
unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with
reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very
truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei
xiv)--namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is
saddened over his own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful
means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2
Corinthians 7:10): "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance,
steadfast unto salvation." And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ
accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule
of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because
such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it
lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But
this did not happen in Christ's case, as stated above (cf. 14, 1, ad 2; 45, 2).
Reply to Objection
3. The pain of a
suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which
exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses
every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ's pain was
the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated
soul. But Adam's body could not suffer, except he sinned, so that he would
become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt
less pain than Christ's body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it
is clear that even if by impassibility Adam had suffered in the state of
innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ's.
Reply to Objection
4. Christ
grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins
of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite
heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the
pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for
all sins, according to Isaiah 53:4: "Surely He hath carried our
sorrows." But such was the dignity of Christ's life in the body,
especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for
one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man's
life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that
the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to
be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue's sake. And in like fashion Christ
laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jeremiah
12:7: "I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies."
Reply to Objection
5. The
sufferer's innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since,
when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but
also because of the crime. whereas the innocent man grieves only for the
penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so
far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that
even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him, according
to Isaiah 57:1: "The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart."
Reply to Objection
6. Christ willed
to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according
to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His
suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according
to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.
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